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Legal Formulations
of a Human Right
to Information
Deﬁning a Global Consensus
Kimberli M. Kelmor

Abstract
There is a growing body of law across the globe that seeks to deﬁne a right
to information. Any study of such laws quickly reveals a great diversity of
deﬁnitions for both the type of information covered and the nature of the
right. Access to various particular types of information is routinely granted
in piecemeal fashion through all levels of government including national
sub-constitutional laws, national constitutions, and regional and international
treaties. In the hierarchy of individual rights, constitutionally granted rights
are commonly perceived as the strongest and are most likely to be accepted
as inviolable. Thus, the increasing number of constitutional provisions granting a right to information, while still technically granting the right as a matter
of law, does at least suggest that such constitutional rights have a source and
justiﬁcation that goes beyond mere law. In the end, a mature statement of
the right to information is more than a list of its current enumerations. Both
effective advocacy and sound legal interpretation will beneﬁt from starting
with the full statement of the right to information — the human right — to
the information that is needed to live self-actualized.

There is a growing body of law across the globe that seeks to deﬁne a right
to information. Any study of such laws quickly reveals a great diversity of deﬁ-

nitions for both the type of information covered and the nature of the right.
Access to various particular types of information is routinely granted in piecemeal fashion through a nation’s sub-constitutional legal process (Right2Info.
org, 20¡2a). Also, at the supra-national level, various rights to information are
being staked out, bit by bit, region by region, through treaties and case law
(Right2Info.org, 20¡2c). There is also a slowly developing right of access to
information based in national constitutions across the globe (Right2Info.org,
20¡2b). In the hierarchy of individual rights, constitutionally granted rights
are commonly perceived as the strongest and are most likely to be accepted
as inviolable. This special status of trumping other laws, while still technically granting the right as a matter of law, does at least suggest that such
constitutional rights have a source and justiﬁcation that goes beyond mere
law.
Just as at the other levels, countries grant access to particular types of
information through their constitutions. The deﬁnition of the right of access
to information and the scope of such right can typically be determined by the
underlying justiﬁcation for creating such a right. To date, the most frequent
method of ﬁnding a constitutional basis for such a right is ﬁnding that the right
of access to information is a necessary corollary to constitutional grants of freedom of speech or other freedoms explicitly stated in the constitution. The goals
of this article are to assess the kinds of information rights and their prevalence;
to determine if there is a global consensus that would strengthen assertions
that there is an international human right to information; and to formulate a
comprehensive statement of the human right of access to information that is
being described through these discrete applications.
Without being sidelined into deep philosophical arguments about the
nature of rights themselves, it is useful to consider the common heuristic of
distinguishing rights as either positive or negative. Frank B. Cross (2000)
describes the distinction in its simplest terms stating that “[o]ne category is a
right to be free from government, while the other is a right to command government action” (p. 864, emphasis in the original). Negative rights prevent
other people or government entities from interfering with an individual’s exercise of that right, while positive rights create an obligation on other people or
government entities to take action to provide the means to the individual to
exercise that right. The current body of access to information law is largely an
enumeration of negative rights interfering with an individual’s access to information. A comprehensive statement of a right of access to information will fall
much closer to the positive rights conception of human rights.
A ﬁnal preliminary thought: of what use is such a formal statement? While
I cite a growing trend of recognizing a constitutional right to information, the
news and reports show increasing limitations on access to information — especially on the grounds of national security. Based on its annual report on press
freedom, the watchdog organization Freedom House reported that “Global

press freedom has fallen to its lowest level in over a decade” (Karlekar & Dunham, 20¡4, p. ¡). In its web page regarding the report the organization stated
that the
decline was driven in part by major regression in several Middle Eastern
states, including Egypt, Libya, and Jordan; marked setbacks in Turkey,
Ukraine, and a number of countries in East Africa; and deterioration in the
relatively open media environment of the United States [FreedomHouse,
20¡4, para. ¡].

The last decade has seen the mass re-classiﬁcation of U.S. government documents (Scott, 2006), and the U.S. White House trend toward denying freedom
of information requests on grounds of national security steadily increased from
3,805 cases in 2009, to 4,243 in 20¡¡, and to 5,223 in 20¡3 (Gillum & Bridis,
20¡3).
As disheartening as that trend is to information rights advocates, it does
not invalidate the trend toward recognizing a right of access to information.
That rights conﬂict is obvious. Human rights lawyers focus on how legal systems
resolve these conﬂicts through legislation and litigation. More broadly though,
such conﬂicts are resolved daily as individuals, organizations, and governmental
entities consider what actions to take. No matter who is resolving the conﬂict,
the more well deﬁned a given right is, the more likely the resolution of such
conﬂict will accurately reﬂect the weight and relevance of that right.

Sources of International Human Rights
A foundational issue to address is just how modern international human
rights are created. As Andrew Clapham (2007) discusses in his opening chapter
of his introductory text on human rights, people view human rights in a multitude of ways. This article will largely follow the view of the lawyer, who “consider[s] that human rights represent almost a term of art, referring to the details
of accepted national and international human rights law” (p. 3).¡ From this
perspective, international human rights come from the same sources as international law. Article 38, §¡ of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(¡945) deﬁnes these sources as:
• international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
• international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
• the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
• subject to the provisions of Article 59 [of this statute], judicial decisions

and the teachings of the most highly qualiﬁed publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Each of the possible sources provides evidence that an international human
right to information of some sort does exist. In analyzing these sources, it is
important to note that there is no requirement that every nation enact such
law, or that the right be formulated exactly the same way.2 As Jordan Paust
(¡996) states, “… human rights law is a complex and dynamic legal process
profoundly interconnected with international law more generally and, like the
latter, with regional and domestic legal processes throughout the globe” (p.
¡47).

Existing Laws That Grant a Right to Information
International Agreements That Grant a Right to Information
International agreements are the most explicit statements of a right to
information. As rules of law enacted by multiple governments, they carry the
greatest weight in establishing a global consensus. Since the ﬁrst was made in
¡948, we now have more than 30 such agreements (Right2Info.org, 20¡2c). Two
examples of agreements that incorporate a right to information as part of other
rights are the following:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers [“Universal declaration of human rights,” ¡948 art. ¡9]; and,

Article ¡9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (¡966),
which also creates a right to information:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.

An example of an international agreement solely concerned with a right
to information is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Access to Ofﬁcial
Documents (2009). This agreement deﬁnes ofﬁcial documents to mean “all
information recorded in any form, drawn up or received and held by public
authorities” (art. ¡) and continues to lay out the right of access to ofﬁcial documents; limitations to access; considerations for the request for access; process
for receiving and fulﬁlling the requests for access; forms of access; charges for
access; review procedure; and other procedural requirements. The signing
countries, and the scope of the right vary by treaty, but charting just the numbers by year makes the growth and the rate of growth readily apparent as shown
in Table ¡.

Table ¡. Growth in Number of International Agreements Granting a Right to Information

National (but Sub-Constitutional) Bases of a Right to Information
Commenting on the historical trend for rights to information, Ackerman
and Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006) reported that the count of countries granting such rights by law grew from ¡0 in ¡995 to 66 by 2005. The Open Society
Justice Initiative and Right2Info.org (20¡4) jointly maintain a list of countries with laws or regulations granting rights to information. As with international agreements, the scope of the right varies with each law, but Table 2 makes
the growth readily apparent. Also apparent is that the numbers do not always
add up the same depending on who is doing the counting. The discrepancy

Table 2. Growth in Number of Countries with Some Sort of Sub-Constitutional Right
to Information

between the counts provided by the Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006)
article, and by the Open Society Justice Initiative and Right2Info.org (20¡4)
web page are not necessarily due to errors, but rather to differences in terminology and deﬁnitions of such rights. These differences are critical in
determining whether or not an international human right to information
exists.

Constitutional Bases of a Right to Information
As of 20¡2, Right2Info.org (20¡2b) reported that the “right of access to
ofﬁcial information is now protected by the constitutions of some 60 countries”
(para. ¡). Adding in countries where the constitutional text has been judicially
interpreted as providing a right of access gives a count of 78 (Right2Info.org,
20¡¡).
It is important to note that, in Table 3, these are constitutional protections,
not sub-constitutional laws. In both practice and theory, rights created by legislative action, governmental agency action, or judicial action, can be overruled
as violating constitutionally granted rights (Dworkin, 2009). While constitutionalism is an especially strong trait in the United States, it is not unique to
the United States. As other countries write, amend, and rewrite their constitutions, those constitutions also become the strongest legal symbol of legitimacy

Table 3. Growth in Number of Countries with a Right to Information in their Constitution

in that country (Scheingold, 2004). The trend toward constitutionalizing rights
to information is therefore a qualitative increase in the weight of such rights,
above and beyond the quantitative increase.

Assessing the Rights Granted:
Is the Right to Information Purely Derivative?
The level of government at which the right to information is granted is
one factor in assessing the strength. A second factor to consider is the scope of
the right granted. Even when granted at the constitutional level, the scope of
the right granted still varies broadly by country. The scope of the right is circumscribed by the underlying theory used to justify the existence of the right
to information. These underlying theories are an independent factor and thus
are largely the same regardless of the level of government creating the right.
By far the most common scope involves a right of citizens to government
held information. For example, Article 32 of the Belgian constitution states
that “Everyone has the right to consult any administrative document and to
obtain a copy, except in the cases and conditions stipulated by the laws, federate
laws or rules referred to in Article ¡34” (“La constitution,” ¡994). Others limit

the scope of the right to information by tying it to the right of freedom of
expression. For example, in Switzerland, Article ¡6 of the constitution (Bundesverfassung) is titled Freedom of Expression and of Information, and states
that,
1. Freedom of expression and of information is guaranteed.
2. Every person has the right freely to form, express, and impart their
opinions.
3. Every person has the right freely to receive information to gather it
from generally accessible sources and to disseminate it [“Bundesverfassung,”
20¡2].
A country-by-country, law-by-law comparison is beyond the scope of this
article and has been thoroughly covered elsewhere.3 Some of the differences in
scope are reﬂected in the terminology used in both law and scholarship. “Freedom of information” is common at both the state and national level in the
United States and typically means some level of responsibility of the government
to provide government held information. “Access to information” has a different
connotation than “Right to information” which tends to include some duty to
provide and perhaps even create the information (Baram, ¡984). Some scholars
advocate for the “right to knowledge” (Emerson, ¡976), and some are expanding
the concept to advocate for a right to information and communication technology (Ifeanyi-Ajufo, 20¡3). But two distinct rubrics for analyzing laws granting rights to information seem to shape the way we think about rights to
information, whatever terminology we use.
The ﬁrst is a functional classiﬁcation that is well explained by Peled and
Rabin (20¡¡) in their analysis of constitutional provisions. They set out four
types of justiﬁcations based on the use of the information:
• Political-democratic justiﬁcation: the right to the information is necessary for citizens to be active participants in their government, and that
such participation is necessary to maintain a democracy.
• Instrumental justiﬁcation: the right to information is necessary to give
meaning to other enumerated rights.
• Proprietary justiﬁcation: the information created by the government is
created and owned by the citizens.
• Oversight justiﬁcation: the government must be held accountable to its
citizens and the right to government held information is necessary for
that accountability and transparency.
Bishop (20¡2), in reviewing treaties and other supra-national means of
establishing rights to information has a slightly different analysis. Expanding
on previous work by Weeramantry (¡994), her work ﬁnds that any right to

information is always a corollary to some other (well established) right, the
strongest of which are,
•
•
•
•

freedom of expression;
information privacy rights to information about themselves;
a right to a healthy environment; and
a right to truth [Bishop, 20¡2].

These different conceptualizations give the rationale and reach of the resulting
rights. Bishop (20¡2) analyzes the various treaties and demonstrates how the
strength of the resulting right is constrained by the underlying conceptualization. Ultimately, she determines the freedom of expression foundation results
in the strongest and most effective rights. Comparing this to Peled and Rabin’s
(20¡¡) work suggests that she views a right to information as mainly an instrumental right and occasionally a proprietary right. Many scholars in the ﬁeld
seem to make any right to information a derivative of other, freestanding
rights.

A Comprehensive Statement of the
Human Right to Information That
Reﬂects Its Integral Relationship
to Other Human Rights
The problem with the above analyses is not that they are necessarily wrong,
but that they are incomplete. The human right to information is all of this, all
at once. A right to information is instrumental to the right of free speech; it is
necessary for government oversight. A right to information is a detailed component of the Aarhus Convention (Convention on access to information, public
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters,
¡998) because it is not possible to have public participation in environmental
matters without such information. It is inherent in each of those situations and
more.
These rubrics for analysis, and speciﬁc instances of their application, are
not actually deﬁning the right to information, and are not merely describing
the ways the right is created. Instead, they are actually ways of constraining
that right. All rights have some limitation, or at least have some instances when
they must be balanced against conﬂicting rights. Theoretical arguments of concrete versus abstract absolutism notwithstanding, no right is absolute (Gewirth,
¡98¡). My right to freely move my ﬁst does in fact end at the tip of your nose.
If not deﬁned by the constraints, what then would be the formulation of
a freestanding right to information? What would be additional facets of that

right? And what other rights would be instrumental to that freestanding right
to information?
Here I step back from the perspective of the lawyer. The lawyer’s view is
one of the best at envisioning and arguing the constraints on rights, and at litigating for preferred outcomes when rights conﬂict. But to deﬁne the freestanding right to information, I step into the role of a rights advocate, and the
perspective of an information specialist.
The human right to information can be nothing less than the right to the
information a human needs to live completely actualized.4 The human right to
information deﬁned that way logically requires
• Accuracy of information. A right to accuracy may seem difﬁcult to
enforce, and depending on interpretations of subjectivity and objectivity,
even theoretically impossible. But just as the constraints of libel and
slander laws constrain freedom of expression by requiring a level of truth
and accuracy, so too can constraints be made to provide some assurances
of accuracy to the right to information.
• Availability of information to all. This in itself has several components
such as
˚ Issues of format: whether information is presented in oral, print, or
digital format, and even whether a digital presentation is formatted
for smart phone or tablet is more than a matter of personal preference. It can, at times, determine whether or not the information is
really available at all.
˚ Issues of cost: some level of subsidization will be required to ensure
that information is available to all regardless of economic status.
This issue comes up frequently in discussions of the “digital divide.”
˚ Issues of open access: mechanisms to protect the impetus that intellectual property rights give to creative work, and mechanisms to
keep intellectual property laws from stiﬂing access to and further
development of creative work.
˚ Issues of accessibility: mechanisms to ensure that information is
available to all regardless of disability.
˚ Issues of privacy and conﬁdentiality: privacy law will need to expand
to more thoroughly protect the information seeker. These are issues
that have long been addressed by librarians in keeping library circulation records conﬁdential, and that are currently as hot as web tracking.
˚ Issues of information literacy: some level of information literacy on
the part of the information seeker is required to have the right to
information be at all meaningful.
• Changes in legal and societal values. Legal and societal issues will need
to be addressed, including but by no means limited to the following:

˚ Cost of information infrastructure: cost was mentioned as inherent
to information being available to all. But there are also the costs of
the overall information infrastructure. Acknowledging the human
right to information will not answer the question of a public versus
a private Internet, but it will deﬁnitely affect the way we answer such
questions.
˚ Duty to provide information: the legal system will need to deﬁne
who will have a duty to provide information that is already in existence.
˚ Duty to create information: the legal system will need to deﬁne if
there is a duty to collect or create information, as well as who will
fulﬁll that duty.
˚ Duty not to obstruct access to information: the legal system will need
to deﬁne whether the duty not to obstruct binds more than just governments?
The growth in laws at all levels deﬁning instances of a right to information
should not be evaluated as if the question is whether there is a global consensus
for some least common denominator derivative right to be found. Instead, each
law cumulatively adds weight to the proposition that there is in fact a strong,
freestanding human right to information. The question is not whether a right
to information about my genetic code has been legislated, but rather is there
something about genetic information and other implicated rights that should
constrain my right to know about my genetic code? Both effective advocacy
and sound legal interpretation will beneﬁt from starting with the full statement
of the right — the human right — to the information that is needed to live selfactualized.

Notes
1. To address the philosophical, ethical, moral, or historical origins of human
rights is far beyond the scope of this article. For such coverage see, for example, Brierly
(20¡2) and Beitz (2009).
2. For more detailed analyses of the required elements to ﬁnd the existence of a
human right see Simma and Alston (¡988).
3. For such coverage, see for example Banisar (2006) and Mendel (2008).
4. This has similarities to both Nussbaum’s (¡997) idea of capabilities and Berlin’s
(¡969) idea of self-realization. This can either be viewed as totally confounding the ideas
of negative or positive rights, or perhaps as transcending them.
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